We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

We introduce a general theory of epistemic random fuzzy sets for reasoning with fuzzy or crisp evidence. This framework generalizes both the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions, and possibility theory. Independent epistemic random fuzzy sets are combined by the generalized product-intersection rule, which extends both Dempster's rule for combining belief functions, and the product conjunctive combination of possibility distributions. We introduce Gaussian random fuzzy numbers and their multi-dimensional extensions, Gaussian random fuzzy vectors, as practical models for quantifying uncertainty about scalar or vector quantities. Closed-form expressions for the combination, projection and vacuous extension of Gaussian random fuzzy numbers and vectors are derived.

Evidence in probabilistic reasoning may be ‘hard’ or ‘soft’, that is, it may be of yes/no form, or it may involve a strength of belief, in the unit interval [0, 1]. Reasoning with soft, [0, 1]-valued evidence is important in many situations but may lead to different, confusing interpretations. This paper intends to bring more mathematical and conceptual clarity to the field by shifting the existing focus from specification of soft evidence to accomodation of soft evidence. There are two main approaches, known as Jeffrey’s rule and Pearl’s method; they give different outcomes on soft evidence. This paper argues that they can be understood as correction and as improvement. It describes these two approaches as different ways of updating with soft evidence, highlighting their differences, similarities and applications. This account is based on a novel channel-based approach to Bayesian probability. Proper understanding of these two update mechanisms is highly relevant for inference, decision tools and probabilistic programming languages.

A reliable modeling of uncertain evidence in Bayesian networks based on a set-valued quantification is proposed. Both soft and virtual evidences are considered. We show that evidence propagation in this setup can be reduced to standard updating in an augmented credal network, equivalent to a set of consistent Bayesian networks. A characterization of the computational complexity for this task is derived together with an efficient exact procedure for a subclass of instances. In the case of multiple uncertain evidences over the same variable, the proposed procedure can provide a set-valued version of the geometric approach to opinion pooling.